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The guidance charges the military with developing innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve U.S. security objectives.
2 After more than a decade of sustained combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government is shifting our posture towards the Asia-Pacific region. The end of the Iraq war and an unfolding transition in Afghanistan, along with demanding fiscal realities, present a decision point for the U.S. military: how do you remain a global leader in all parts of the world? For the foreseeable future, the U.S. must share the costs and responsibilities for providing global security with our international partners by leveraging current alliances with partners and forging new ones.
To meet the challenges presented by the future strategic environment, the DSG advocates creating new opportunities to build capacity of our allies and partners around the world in order to share security burdens. Security cooperation, security assistance and partner capacity building are the mechanisms for getting this done and will greatly benefit the U.S. military as we face complex challenges associated with an uncertain security environment of the next decade. Building Partner Capacity (BPC) has been an important issue for the last two U.S. Secretaries of Defense. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed that the U.S. Government get better at building partner capacity by helping other countries help themselves or by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance so they would be prepared to fight alongside U.S. forces. 3 Secretary Leon Panetta echoed this message during a 2 recent speech where he stated that "partner capacity is an essential military mission and must remain an integral component of our approach outlined by the DSG." 4 The last decade has also brought tremendous change to the global information environment. Technological advances and an increasing use of social media platforms have connected people in more ways across greater distances than ever before. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. will continue to face a complex operational and media environment in which "a 24/7 global media industry, and the rapid growth of the use of the Internet and social media have changed dramatically." 5 Because the public has come to expect timely and accurate information, military public affairs (PA) operations have to be particularly coherent and rapid in order to have an impact on the audiences we are informing. Additionally, U.S. military actions will likely be undertaken as part of a multinational alliance or coalition. To truly succeed in this environment, it is critical to have allies and partners who are credible and trustworthy and who also have competent public affairs officers 6 and processes to support U.S. communication efforts.
It is essential for public affairs to be a key part of BPC in order to assist our allies and partners to achieve dominance in the information domain. When we assist our partners in the development of PA standards, processes and skills, they achieve a greater understanding of the strategic impact of communication and therefore will better complement our communication efforts during a contingency. BPC requires little investment from the U.S. but can achieve great strategic impact and positively impact mission success.
There is little to no literature describing how the U.S. military supports the development of other nations' public affairs capabilities. This paper will explore how 3 U.S. public affairs skills and knowledge as a "means" supports the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives; it will then explain how developing our partner's public affairs capabilities fulfill the "ways" of the strategy. Examining the ways and means from the PA perspective will then be followed up by exploring some examples from the institutional environment, combatant commands and Service Component PA staffs.
The paper will then share best practices from the examples.
The Doctrine of Building Partner Capacity
Building Partner Capacity (BPC) is routinely highlighted in strategic documents but not specifically defined by joint doctrine. However, U.S. Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) recently published U.S. Army Concept for Building Partner
Capacity which defines BPC as the "outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions." 7 As defined by the Army, there are three tenets of a comprehensive BPC approach. First, it creates recurring engagement that sustains partner trust and confidence. Secondly, it develops enduring capabilities ("the ability to perform a function") that prevent and deter regional instability by improving operational capacity ("the extent of a capability present") in the short term and self-sustaining institutional capacity in the long term. 8 Finally, it focuses on partner nation human capital, providing the vehicle for lasting impact on our partners' professional security force capability. 9 Although dated, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review captured BPC as the term for activities that used to be called security cooperation, and may even include the broader concept of peacetime engagement. 10 Over the last decade, building Security assistance (SA) is an element of security cooperation by which the U.S.
provides defense materials, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to advance U.S. national policies and objectives. These legislatively approved and funded programs are authorized by Department of State to be administered by DoD/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 13 The U.S. military is also charged with security force assistance, which is a more complex form of SA focused on training, equipping and advising foreign security forces in order to increase their capacities and capabilities.
14 While partner capacity and capability are clearly defined in joint doctrine, some confusion is associated with the BPC mission to integrate our partners into ongoing and future U.S.-led coalition operations around the world. Retired Army Lt. Gen. James
Dubik, who is considered to be a subject matter expert on ways to improve U.S. and allied training of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere, used a recent article to clear up some confusion associated with the BPC mission. 15 Dubik identifies three categories of partner-capacity missions as they apply to military forces: building the capacity of current allies and partners with already mature military forces; fixing the tactical shortcomings of indigenous military forces; and creating both military forces and institutions. 16 In the first category, Dubik points out that the capacities of our European allies and partners have degraded due to a reduction of military spending that began after the Cold War. This makes it more important for the U.S. to rededicate itself to a "system of alliance and partnerships appropriate for the current strategic environment." 17 These relationships provide key strategic benefits for the U.S. such as access to airspace, logistics, and air and sea ports of entry all essential at the theater and global level.
However, the U.S. cannot increase the capacity of these mature allies and partners if we don't have a force large enough to commit resources that will sustain the relationship.
Dubik's second category for capacity-building missions calls for broadening our focus and improving the institutional and support systems of the indigenous military forces we work with. This category is defined as "improving battlefield performance of our partners and increasing a force's confidence." 18 It is not enough to fix the tactical 6 shortcomings associated with a military force; these are usually the symptoms of an underlying problem with the organization. For example, poor personnel policies may contribute to insufficient pay and allowances and a corrupt promotion system. 19 Dubik points out that the BPC mission should not be limited to special operations forces as they are a limited asset. He asserts that general purpose forces are more than capable of executing the mission. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review also focused on strengthening the general purpose forces capabilities for the BPC mission by allowing service components to add more than 500 personnel to their train-the-trainer units for general purpose forces. 20 The last category of BPC missions that Dubik describes is the most expansive of the three and "requires a broad enterprise approach that builds security forces simultaneously with creating security ministry proficiency." 21 25 As we develop PA capacity with our partners, we will need to be aware of differences and approaches.
There are differences between U.S. military PA processes and partner nation processes. The first difference pertains to the audiences we communicate with. While the U.S. military has an obligation to communicate with the American public, our partners may not view communicating with their national audience as a priority. AsianPacific armies are a prime example of this dynamic; although they execute media relations, many view command information as a higher priority. 26 Another difference pertains to legal authorities. The institutions of our allies and partners may operate 8 under different legal and statutory authorities so we don't want to "Americanize" their communication efforts.
The third difference pertains to the organizational structure and roles of the public affairs officer (PAO). Some of our partners combine public affairs and other information activities under one staff which may cause some concern for the U.S. PAO providing support. There has been a lot of discussion over the last eight years concerning the separation of public affairs and information operations in the U.S. military. In 2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning about the risks of integrating public affairs and information operations. 27 Following that, the Public Relations Society of America publicly advocated a "firewall separation between information operations and public affairs." 28 Many commanders acknowledged the guidance but still found a way to harness the capabilities of both disciplines to enhance unity of effort and increase mission effectiveness. We need to follow the same approach when executing the BPC mission. If our partners are required to exercise a broader communication skillset, we must integrate other staff expertise to support this important mission.
Not only are there differences in how PA is situated in partner nations, our allies and partners will fall at different points of the spectrum as it pertains to public affairs
skills. An assessment of our partner's PA capability allows us to plan an appropriate engagement strategy. BPC is by design, and by activity, a win-win strategy; the U.S.
should conduct the assessments in concert with the partner nation and pick which approach is best for achieving objectives for both countries.
Depending on the capabilities of our partner PAO, the U.S. military PA staff will build an approach based on three levels: foundational, developmental, and advanced.
Partner militaries that lack dedicated PA offices and express interest in building their capabilities are classified as foundational. In these cases, the U.S. should encourage that military to invest in PA education and arrange for further PA training for select officers or civilians. In the interim, U.S. military PAOs working with that country can sponsor media training for the partner nation's military leaders so they are better prepared to address the press. This also exposes military senior leaders to the benefits of a PA program. The developmental level may involve training exercises with a more capable partner that seeks to improve proficiency and interoperability of both parties.
Once a relationship is established with a partner in the developmental level, the U.S. Unfortunately, the United States is behind the power curve when it comes to understanding international audiences, well enough to disseminate messages that are packaged in ways that resonate. 31 This is mainly due to a lack of cultural expertise and audience knowledge. Our partners must take a greater role in helping the United States build and maintain relationships with relevant publics. In some cases, partner nations PAOs are the appropriate and credible messengers that should deliver the message.
The U.S. military must have partners who possess specific PA skills, capabilities, and principles to enable their mutual success in the complex information environment.
There is no single reference indicating which basic and advanced level PA skills are appropriate for any Ministry of Defense, but the Department of Defense (DoD)
Principles of Information offers a starting point. These fundamental communication principles chart the course for all DoD PA activities, and apply to the full continuum of day-to-day activities and operations. Two key principles from the principles are "making available timely and accurate information" to the various publics and "information shall be made fully and readily available." 32 U.S. military PAOs remember these principles by way of the phrase "maximum disclosure, minimum delay."
Basic level PA skills include writing for audience, staff coordination, and advising commanders for effective interviews using different mediums. These skills and principles may be universal to U.S. communicators but may take some time for our partners to absorb and realize the benefits associated with them. Although our partner nations PAOs reflect of their country's cultural norms and beliefs, these principles offer a generally universal baseline for internal and external communication and should supersede any cultural differences.
As we align the right public affairs skills and processes against a partner's unique mission requirements, we will determine that our partners possess advanced PA capabilities and others need improvement. Higher order skills that may be evaluated include the ability to plan integrated PA operations; to provide advice to commanders; to coordinate/deconflict communications with partner nations; to synchronize communications across nations in order to achieve more credible results with greater reach; coordinate a social media program; and to coordinate with other agencies when crises or physical emergencies arise. A key skill at the advanced level is drafting a communications plan with supporting public affairs guidance that facilitates conducting complementary multinational operations. Routine assessments of the development of our partner's PA skills ensures U.S. military PAOs build capability with each engagement and achieves positive return from our efforts. The U.S. military must achieve the desired objectives associated with PA support to BPC by investing in education, training, and language skills. Basic PA skills are best trained in the institutional environment and further developed through collective training and experiential learning. We must encourage our partners to take advantage of basic and advanced levels of public affairs training offered at U.S. and NATO institutions.
Multinational courses provide PA instruction but more importantly, build lasting professional relationships with our counterparts from other nations. Routine engagements, training exercises and participation in multinational operations will assist in developing advanced PA skills but may take years to master. The development of PA skills is an investment in our partners and requires hard work to achieve the optimal public affairs endstate. The hope is that the plan will be implemented by their nation when the student returns home. There are some commonalities among the CCMDs on how they communicate their BPC efforts although there is no formal strategy for building partner PA capacity.
Written orders are one way although none of the PA annexes specifically state BPC as part of a mission set or specific task; public websites are another means to communicate BPC efforts. A review of all the public affairs annexes in support of each CCMD's Theater Campaign Plan revealed no specific reference to PA support to the BPC mission. Many of the PA staffs are focused on traditional public affairs tasks however they outline the work done with the U.S. Embassy PAO to coordinate with host-nation government press/information and military PA offices on the CCMD's behalf.
Similar to other U.S. public affairs staffs, the CCMD PA office focuses its efforts on informing the American and international publics to gain their support for operations.
Additionally, the offices provide internal/command information for American forces in theater and support coalition public information operations. This annual exercise is hosted by Jordan and includes U.S. troop participation from CENTCOM. Overall, the Eager Lion exercise is designed to promote cooperation and interoperability among more than 11,000 participating troops from 19 countries to build functional capacity and enhance readiness. 49 Operating under a Combined-Joint- Task organizations. An article in Time magazine described this as a "big deal" since the Egyptian military, especially their generals, never engage the media. 53 Prior to this development, a strong relationship with the press did not seem to be a priority for the Egyptian military. In fact, in an effort to push back against public criticism, the Egyptian military warned the Egyptian news media to censor critical reporting of the Egyptian military in June 2011. Perhaps the empowerment of the PAOs will offer some transparency for the Egyptian military and build a better relationship with "ordinary Egyptians." 54 Generally speaking, Middle Eastern PAOs possess the basic PA skills but need greater assistance with integrated planning and social media. 55 Some of these tasks may include developing a communication plan and getting buy-in for that plan from the DoMG. CENTCOM recognizes that there is some disparity within the capabilities among the countries. Despite that, our Middle Eastern military partners are very capable and know how to communicate. 56 The greater challenge is broadening the U.S. mindset to dispel the belief that the U.S. way is the best way. This attitude can alienate our partners rather than fostering a relationship built on mutual trust and respect. From The EUCOM public affairs office has a strong role in the partnership mission with the IDF and has established a Combined Standard Operating Procedure (CSOP) with the IDF public affairs office. Both staffs agreed upon a set of media guidelines to be followed in peacetime that are also applicable in the event of a contingency. 60 The theater faces complex threats (transnational, terrorism, domestic) with origins and support that are land-based, so USARPAC works diligently to build partner capacity and capability so allies and partners can operate independently within their own borders and potentially as part of a multinational effort in response to larger threats. 63 As USARPAC The public affairs support for Yama Sakura 63 was synchronized between the U.S. and Japan long before the exercise commencement. USARPACs PA staff established and maintained a routine, ongoing relationship with the JGSDF PA staff.
They participated in planning conferences leading up to the exercise and developed the public affairs plan that included an opening press conference, photo opportunities and the command information plan. 
Conclusion
National and DoD strategic guidance emphasizes the need to leverage the capabilities of our allies and partners to share the burden of addressing future security 29 threats and to bolster their defense self-sufficiency. The evolution of the information environment will continue to place greater demand on the U.S. military, and social media platforms will increasingly become a conduit of information. Our adversaries will also leverage similar platforms to support the achievement of their objectives. The rapid flow of information in this environment will mean public affairs officers will have a limited amount of time to "relate a coherent and credible narrative of success, progress, and positive consequences that extends beyond the reach of a command's actual physical presence." 70 In some cases, success or failure for a mission will be tied to the efficacy of that military command's information campaign. For the foreseeable future, U.S. military
PAOs will work alongside counterparts from partner nations prompting a need to develop partner PA skills in order to better complement U.S. communication efforts. The development of public affairs skills, capabilities and processes must be a key part of BPC in order to assist our allies and partners to achieve dominance in the information domain. U.S. military PAOs at the institutional and operational level support the building partner capacity mission and building capabilities that produce lasting capacity in our partners. Building public affairs capacity in our partners may start with training but must then develop through experiential development and education. As the U.S. looks for innovative and low cost ways to develop capability and capacity in our partners around the globe, leading the development of other nations' public affairs capacity is a critical investment in these partnerships, as required by the DSG to secure mutual security interests.
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